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I. Introduction
The flow of migrant workers from Mexico played a significant role in the
development of the U.S. economy in the twentieth century. The initiation of the Bracero
guestworker program in 1942 began a long period of growth in the flow migrant workers,
both legal and illegal across the U.S.-Mexico border. The Bracero program was designed
to bring workers from Mexico into the United States to relieve labor shortages during
World War II and continued to help the agricultural industry feed the post-war baby
boom. The program was terminated in 1964 due to public opinion towards poor living
conditions for migrant workers, but workers have continued to migrate north from
Mexico each year for seasonal work. The U.S. economy, particularly the agricultural
sector, has relied heavily on this supply of temporary and seasonal labor. Immigration
and Naturalization Services estimated approximately five million undocumented
immigrants living in the United States in 1996. Washington States agricultural employers
estimate that illegal workers account for approximately fifty to seventy percent of the
agricultural labor force {The Seattle Times, June 2001).
There are many economic, political, and social issues that arise as a result of the
flow of both documented and undocumented migrant labor. Essentially, many industries
in the U.S. economy have been able to benefit from the cheap labor that migrant workers
provide, but in general we are not willing to share with these workers the benefits of legal
or permanent residency. There are two main questions that will be addressed in this paper
regarding the flow of Mexican migrant workers. First, what are the driving factors that
cause illegal migration from Mexico to the U.S.? And secondly, using the evidence from
the first question, what is the best means of decreasing the flow of undocumented
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migration from Mexico to the U.S. in order to minimize the burdens placed upon illegal
migrants?
These questions will be discussed in this paper in the context of an empirical
analysis of the flow of undocumented migrant labor from Mexico to the U.S between
1977 and 2000. This analysis will look at the impact of an immigration reform act of
1986 as well as the effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994. The
results of this analysis help provide insight into possible outcomes of future reform acts
or free trade treaties, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, which is to
be enacted by the year 2005. The FTAA would have similar implications for migrant
labor as NAFTA, but would be expanded to affect the flow of migrant workers who come
to the U.S. from countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala.
The analysis of migrant labor for this paper is in the form of an ordinary least
squares regression to estimate the flow of undocumented migrant labor. The empirical
results can be used to determine what factors have the most significant effect on the flow
of undocumented migration. When considering the current issues with respect to
undocumented seasonal migration we must look at both the economic and social
perspectives. This paper will attempt to provide both of these perspectives and discuss the
implications of future proposals headed by President Bush and President Vicente Fox of
Mexico, both of whom appear to be interested in expanding guestworker programs for
Mexican migrants. President Fox has also expressed an interest in moving towards an
open border system for labor mobility between the U.S. and Mexico.
Section II of this paper gives a review of previous literature regarding migrant
labor. Section III discusses the economic theory of the flow of undocumented migrant
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workers. Section IV discusses the data used for the empirical analysis of the flow of
migrant labor. Section V provides a discussion of the statistical methods and the
predicted results of the model. The empirical results of the regression analysis are given
in Section VI, followed by a conclusion given in Section VII. The conclusion will include
a discussion of the social implications of the current system and proposed options for the
future, which must be considered along with the empirical evidence.

II. Literature Review
A considerable amount of research has been done regarding international
migration, particularly with respect to the relationship of international trade and labor
mobility. Lalonde and Topel (1997) discuss the impact of migrants on the labor market
and the net benefits of migrant labor to the receiving country. Lalonde and Topel state
that wage differentials are the main driving force of migration. According to this theory,
as wages and living standards between the two countries converge, migration will
decrease. Lalonde and Topel’s research included a study of the overall net contribution of
immigrant workers to the receiving country’s economy using U.S. data from 1950 to
1974. The study used data of estimated tax payments by immigrant workers, and total
government transfers received by these workers. Total transfers include unemployment
insurance, public welfare, food stamps, social security. Medicare, Medicaid, and
education for children. The study also subtracted an additional amount calculated as the
per family government expenditure on public goods that immigrants benefit from. The
overall net benefit received by the U.S. economy from the average immigrant worker was
determined to be approximately $1,300 for each sample in the study (Lalonde and Topel,
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1997). This amount may have decreased since the study was done because the average
number of immigrants living below the poverty line has increased, which suggests an
increase in government transfers received by immigrants.
Razin and Sadka (1997) discuss the implications of trade barriers for labor
mobility. Their article suggests that labor mobility in many cases serves as a substitute
for capital movement and trading of goods and services. However, labor mobility can
also serve as a complement to flows of capital and goods and services, in some cases. The
question of whether increased trade can decrease migration, according to Razin and
Sadka, depends on whether labor migration is viewed as a substitute or a complement to
trade.
Razin and Sadka also agree that wage differences between countries are the
driving force of labor migration. Social frictions related to migration, according to their
article, arise during times of unemployment in the receiving country or when social
welfare programs are too comprehensive. When the labor market is tight, migrant
workers with lower reservation wages tend to exacerbate the problem of unemployment.
Migrant workers who are receiving lower wages also tend to make greater use of social
welfare programs such as food stamps or Medicaid. Many native workers do not want to
see government funds spent on workers who are not U.S. citizens, many of whom do not
even have legal residency.
Acevedo and Espenshade (1992) give a summary of their prediction of the effects
of a North American Free Trade Agreement on the flow of migration. Their research
predicted that NAFTA would lead to increased migration in the short run due to
increasing capital in Mexico that would replace labor, and the commercialization of
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agriculture that would destroy jobs for many rural Mexicans. This implies that labor
mobility would be a complement to the flow of capital in the short run. However,
Acevedo and Espenshade predict that in the long run a free trade agreement would
improve Mexico’s economy, increasing wages and employment, which would lead to a
decrease in migration to the U.S. The long run relationship between the flow of migrant
labor and the flow of capital would therefore be assumed to be substitutes. Currently we
are only able to look at five years worth of post-NAFTA data, so it is difficult to say
whether we are looking at the long run effect on the flow of migration, or whether we are
still experiencing short run impacts from the free trade agreement.
Boijas, Freeman, and Lang’s 1991 study of undocumented Mexican-born workers
in the United States used a regression analysis of the flow of migration across the U.S.Mexico border similar to what is done in this paper. However, their study regarded the
period from 1967 to 1984, and addressed issues such as the impact of the termination of
the Bracero program. They concluded that the increase in illegal migration during the
period preceding 1976 may have been a result of the decision to terminate the Bracero
program, but also may have resulted from changing economic conditions in both the U.S.
and Mexico. The regression done in this paper will address the impact of similar factors
on the flow of undocumented migration, but looking at the period from 1977 to 2000.

III. Theory
In order to understand the flow of migrant labor we must first analyze the theory
behind this migration behavior. The decision to migrate temporarily to another country
for work can be modeled using an expected income equation for the gains from
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migration. The decision to migrate is based on a number of factors such as the wage level
that can be earned at home, the availability of jobs at home, the wages that can be earned
in the foreign country, the availability of jobs in the foreign country, and the cost of
migrating. The expected income from migrating can be modeled as follows:

Elm = ER * Wf * (1 - URf) - Ac* (F + C),
where ER = exchange rate, Wf = foreign wage, URf= foreign unemployment rate, Ac =
expected average number of apprehensions, F = fine that may be incurred as a result of
apprehension and C = cost of migration. This equation calculates the amount of income
that will be earned in the foreign country and subtracts the cost of migrating. The
expected average number of apprehensions will be a function of the current probability of
apprehension, and an individual’s experience in illegal border crossing. The expected
income from migration is compared with the expected income from staying at home:
EIh=Wh(l-URh),
where Wh= wage at home and URh= unemployment rate at home. According to
economic theory, workers will maximize their total expected income. If the net expected
income from migrating (Elm - Elh) is positive then a worker will choose to migrate. As
wages abroad rise and unemployment abroad falls, then the expected income from
migrating increases, leading to an increase in the flow of migration. As the probability of
apprehension increases, the expected income from migrating falls, which will cause
fewer people to migrate.
This model assumes that an individual will make as many attempts as necessary
to cross the border successfully. The model would become more complex by adding the
effect of the varying amount of time an individual plans to remain in the foreign country.
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However, we will assume that the decision in this model is based on the intent to stay in
the foreign country for one given period. For seasonal migrant workers from Mexico, this
period is generally about six months. The wages in this case would then be equal to the
income over the six-month period, however this is proportional to the hourly wage.
The cost of migration, C, includes various costs that are incurred both through
travel and the costs of temporary relocation. One travel cost for many people crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border is the need to hire someone to guide them safely across the border,
called a “coyote”, in order to decrease the risk of apprehension. Other costs include
temporary housing costs, health care while away from home, education costs for families
migrating with children, and many other costs associated with leaving one’s home on a
temporary basis.
The factors that affect the decision to migrate, discussed above, will be used in
this paper to estimate a linear regression of the flow of migrant workers from Mexico to
the U.S. The effects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and the 1994
North American Free Trade Agreement are also included in the regression. Both of these
policy reforms may have had a significant impact on the relative expected incomes from
migrating and staying at home for many Mexican migrants.

IV.

Data
By definition, the flow of undocumented migrant labor is difficult to measure.

Because we do not have accurate measurements of this flow, we use data for border
apprehensions provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Services as a proxy for
the number of undocumented migrant workers who have entered the United States. INS
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border apprehension data has been used frequently in previous research regarding the
flow of undocumented migration (Espenshade, 1995). However, there are many
difficulties with using this proxy data. For example, people who are apprehended at the
border are sent back to Mexico and often make several attempts before a successful
crossing and therefore may be counted multiple times. The number of border
apprehensions tells us how many people are arrested at the border, but it does not tell us
how many people succeed in crossing the border. The number of attempted crossings will
be a function of the perceived success rate. Esi)enshade’s 1995 research concluded that
border apprehensions and successful crossings are correlated at 0.90. His analysis
estimates that the actual flow of undocumented migrant workers is approximately 2.2
times the number of apprehensions.
Espenshade’s analysis is useful as an approximation, but it is very unlikely that
the percentage of apprehensions remains constant over time. A recent Seattle Times
article from June 2001 stated that the likelihood of border apprehension is currently about
20%. The INS has tried many different policy initiatives in order to find the best way of
controlling the increasing number of undocumented aliens in the United States. At times
INS policy emphasizes border control, and at other times they emphasize random raids of
businesses and deportation of undocumented workers. For this reason, the probability of
apprehension can change based on changes in INS policy. Hanson and Spilimbergo
(1999) showed that border enforcement is negatively correlated with prices in certain
industries (such as fruits, vegetables, and apparel) that typically rely on undocumented
labor. Border enforcement also is found to increase during times of tight labor markets.
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From this study it seems that INS policy adjusts to accommodate U.S. industries based on
the demand for undocumented labor.
Boijas, Freeman, and Lang’s research found that border patrol spending by the
INS went from twenty million dollars in 1967 to forty-eight million in 1986 (calculated in
1967 dollars), a 140% increase in spending in a period of less than twenty years. For this
reason they hypothesized that observed changes in border apprehensions could be
attributed more to changes in border patrol spending rather than to changes in the actual
flow of migration. Borjas, Freeman, and Lang’s analysis using data regarding border
patrol budgets from the INS concluded that during the period from 1967 to 1986 about
one fourth of the observed increase in border apprehensions could be attributed to
increases in spending for border enforcement. They concluded that the growth in illegal
migration across the border is largely overstated by the use of border apprehensions for
that period, and that the actual growth rate of migration during the sample period was
approximately half of the growth rate of apprehensions. However, since there is no way
to control for INS policy changes in this study, Espenshade’s correlation coefficient of
0.90 will be used as an approximation.
Figure 1 below shows border apprehensions from 1976 to 2000.

-9-

Figure 1: Border Apprehensions

There is a noticeable spike in the data in 1986, which is most likely a result of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act that was passed in that year. Besides this obvious
deviation, there seems to be an overall upward trend in the data over time.
Other data used in this regression of the flow of migrant labor includes the U.S.Mexico exchange rate and Mexico’s minimum salary, as provided by the Bank of
Mexico. The data for Mexico’s minimum salary is given in pesos with a base year of
1978. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean provides data for
the unemployment rate in Mexico. We also look at the U.S. unemployment rate, as given
by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, and the U.S. federal minimum wage, which is
given in nominal U.S. dollars. The U.S. unemployment rate variable might pick up some
of the changes in border patrol enforcement that Hansen and Spilembergo found are
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correlated with changes in the condition of the U.S. labor market. Graphs of the exchange
rate data, and minimum wages in both countries are given in Figures 2, 3, and 4. The
exchange rate and Mexico’s minimum wage both show large changes in the trend in
1994. This is most likely a result of the i)eso crash that occurred during this year.

Figure2: Exchange Rate
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Figure 3: Minimum Wage in Mexico (pesos)

Figure4: U.S. Minimum Wage ($)
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V.

Statistical Methods
The border apprehension data is used to do an ordinary least squares regression

analysis of the flow of undocumented migrant labor as a function of Mexico’s
unemployment rate and minimum wage, the U.S. unemployment rate and minimum wage
and the U.S.-Mexico exchange rate. The regression is done using Eviews; a computer
program for economic data analysis. The relationship between each of these variables and
the flow of migrant workers can be predicted using the model of migratory behavior
discussed in Section II. The predicted relationship of the flow of migration and Mexico’s
unemployment rate is positive. According to the theory, as the probability of finding
employment in Mexico falls, the relative expected income from migration increases. The
minimum wage in Mexico is predicted to have a negative effect on the flow of migrant
labor. When workers are able to find higher paying jobs in Mexico, they are less likely to
risk being apprehended at the border and incur additional costs of migration. The
predicted effect of the U.S. unemployment rate is negative because as unemployment
rises in the U.S., Americans are more likely to fill the lower-paying agricultural jobs,
leaving fewer jobs available for migrant workers, decreasing the expected income from
migration. As the U.S. minimum wage rises we expect more migrant labor from Mexico
because of the possibility of higher paying jobs in the U.S., increasing the expected
income from migration. However, the federal minimum wage laws, in general, are not
applicable to agricultural labor and are often ignored in the case of undocumented
workers, so this may not have a significant impact on the flow of undocumented migrant
labor.

-13-

It is possible that the minimum wage and unemployment rates in the two
countries may display some characteristics of multicollinearity, meaning there is a high
correlation between the explanatory variables. Changes in the minimum wage, according
to economic theory, will often cause changes in the unemployment rate, implying that the
two pairs of variables may be significantly correlated. However, it is unlikely that the
unemployment rate responds only to changes in the minimum wage, and so we cannot
exclude either of the variables. Also included in this regression is the impact of the
exchange rate of pesos per dollar. We expect that as the exchange rate increases, the flow
of migrant labor will increase because workers can get more pesos for every dollar
earned, increasing the expected income from migration.
Two additional dummy variables are added to this regression to take into account
the impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and the 1994 North
American Free Trade Agreement. Each of these variables may have had a direct impact
on the expected incomes from migrating to the U.S. and from remaining in Mexico.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was designed to decrease
undocumented immigration to the United States. One portion of IRCA was to provide an
amnesty opportunity for people who had been living continuously in the United States
since before 1982. These people were given the opportunity to apply for legal residency
through the INS. IRCA granted legal residency to approximately 2.8 million U.S.
residents. This amnesty opportunity most likely would not have a significant impact on
the flow of seasonal migrant laborers because the people who met the eligibility criteria
'vere not necessarily migrant workers, but rather those who had already established long
term, undocumented residency in the United States. It is possible however, that this
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amnesty would cause more people from Mexico to choose to cross the border in
anticipation of another amnesty opportunity in the future, leading to an increase in border
apprehensions.
Another portion of IRCA designated specific penalties for employers who hired
undocumented workers. Employers, under IRCA, are now subject to a $250 to $10,000
fine for each undocumented worker, in addition to a possible six-month prison sentence.
These penalties give significant incentives for employers to require valid documentation
of all workers, and could decrease the number of employers willing to hire illegal migrant
workers. Due to this decrease in the number of available migrant jobs, consequently
decreasing the expected income from migrating, we expect IRCA to have a negative
impact on the flow of undocumented migrant labor. Because the agricultural industry has
relied so heavily on undocumented seasonal workers, they were given more time to make
the transition to documented labor. The provisions of IRCA stated that agricultural
employers had until December I, 1988 to comply with the new regulations regarding
documentation. For this reason the dummy variable for IRCA begins in 1988.
Looking at the graph of border apprehensions we see a spike in the data around
1986, which may have been an initial short-run reaction to the new regulations. If
workers expected a decrease in the number of available jobs starting in 1988, there may
have been an initial increase in the number of migrant workers during the period before
the regulations were to be implemented in the agricultural industry. Another explanation
for this spike in the data is that the INS may have increased border patrol at the time
immediately following the enactment of IRCA, which would cause a change in the
correlation of border apprehensions and the actual flow of migrant workers.
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ERCA also included a provision to begin a guestworker program called H-2A.
This program gives agricultural employers the opportunity to use alien migrant workers
for seasonal or temporary work during times of labor shortage. There is a significant
amount of paperwork involved in using H-2A workers and many restrictions are placed
on the employers. Due to the difficulty of hiring H-2A workers, many agricultural
employers continue to use undocumented workers, even with the threat of fines.
The North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 is another policy that may
have significantly impacted the flow of undocumented migration. NAFTA allowed free
trade and free mobility of capital between the U.S., Mexico and Canada starting in 1995.
This meant U.S. companies were able to move their businesses to Mexico, which many
did in order to have access to a large pool of cheap labor. Acevedo and Espenshade
predicted short run increases in the flow of migration from Mexico, but a long run
improvement in Mexico’s economy that would eventually decrease the flow of migrant
workers to the U.S. If we assume an increase in available jobs in Mexico provided by
American owned factories in the long run, we would predict NAFTA to have a negative
impact on the flow of undocumented migrant labor due to the increased expected income
from remaining in Mexico. This assumes that agricultural migrant workers are now
taking factory jobs in Mexico. If the wages paid are significantly higher than what can be
earned in agriculture, it is safe to assume that at least some agricultural workers are
transitioning to factory work in order to receive higher wages. The fact that American
factories are paying higher wages than Mexican owned factories implies that overall
wages in Mexico are increasing, which leads to a decrease in the relative returns to
migration. If we predict a negative effect from NAFTA on the flow of migrant labor, than
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we are assuming that according to Razin and Sadka’s research, labor mobility is a
substitute for the flow of capital and goods and services. The social implications that
arise as a result of both NAPTA and IRCA will be discussed further in the conclusion
section of this paper.

VI.

Empirical Results
The results of the ordinary least squares regression of border apprehensions on the

seven variables discussed above are shown in Table 1. An initial test of the data indicated
the presence of autocorrelation, which means that the error terms for the regression may
be correlated from one year to the next, a common problem with time series data, causing
the coefficient estimates to be inefficient. An additional lagged dependent variable,
AR(1), was added to account for the correlation over time.
Table 1
Dependent Variable:
Apprehensions

Variable
Constant
Exchange Rate
(pesos/$)
Minimum wage
(Mexico)
Minimum wage
(U.S.)
Unemployment Rate
(Mexico)
Unemployment Rate
(U.S.)
NAFTA

IRCA

AR(1)

Coefficient
212175.5
21772.31

t-statistics
0.227885
0.116863

Probabilitv
0.8230
0.9086

16.91427

0.429887

0.6738

141730.9

0.489880

0.6318

78025.96

1.244397

0.2338

-5291.175

-0.089381

0.9300

-69979.06
-213226.4
0.574088

-0.119461
-0.958824
2.469359

0.9066
0.3539
0.0270

R-squared

0.740683

F-Statistic

4.998493

Adjusted R-squared

0.592502

Probability (F-stat)

0.004390

Durbin-Watson

2.102448
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The probability of the F-statistic is 0.004, which means that the model overall gives
significant information regarding border apprehensions. It is highly unlikely that all of
the explanatory variables in this regression have no effect on the flow of migration. The
R-squared value of 0.74 is equivalent to stating that this model can explain 74% of the
deviations from the mean flow of migrant labor. Looking at the t-statistics and probability
values, we see that none of the individual coefficients in this regression are statistically
significant.
Most of the signs of the coefficients for this regression are consistent with what
was predicted by the theory, however there are some discrepancies. Mexico’s minimum
wage in this regression has a positive effect on the flow of migration, contrary to what the
theory predicts. However, the coefficient has a very low t-statistic of only 0.43, indicating
that this result is not very significant. The U.S. unemployment rate has a negative
coefficient indicating that unemployment in the U.S. has a negative impact on the flow of
undocumented migrant labor. This result is consistent with the theory that U.S. workers
will fill the low-wage agricultural jobs during times of high unemployment, leaving
fewer jobs available for migrant workers. The U.S. minimum wage, Mexico’s
unemployment rate, and the exchange rate (pesos/dollar) all have positive effects on the
supply of migrant labor, according to this regression. The U.S. minimum wage does not
have a significant impact on the flow of migration, which is consistent with the prediction
that the U.S. minimum wage would be less likely to have a significant impact on the flow
of migrant labor due to the exclusion of agricultural labor in the minimum wage laws.
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The coefficients of both dummy variables are negative as was predicted, but are not
statistically significant.
The possible presence of multicollinearity among the variables could account for
the lack of significant individual coefficients in this regression. Multicollinearity often
causes the variance of the individual estimators to be large, yielding smaller t-statistics. It
is possible to look at the effects of a wage ratio rather than the effects of the individual
wages in each country, in order to decrease the number of explanatory variables, and
possibly decrease the effects of multicollinearity. The wage ratio is calculated by
multiplying the Mexican minimum wage by the exchange rate ($/peso) and then dividing
by the U.S. minimum wage. The wage ratio is graphed in Figure 5 below.

Figures: Wage Ratio (Mexico/U.S.)

If we use the one wage ratio variable in the regression instead of the three independent
variables, we can see how the flow of migrant workers has been impacted by the change
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in Mexican wages relative to U.S. wages. The relationship of the wage ratio to the flow
of migrant workers, according to the theory, is predicted to be negative. As wages in
Mexico increase relative to U.S. wages, we expect that the flow of migration will
decrease as a result of the decline in the relative returns from migrating. The results of
this regression are given below. This regression did not indicate the presence of
autocorrelation, and therefore the lagged dependent variable has been omitted.

Table 3
Dependent Variable:
Apprehensions
Variable
Constant
Wage Ratio
Unemployment Rate
(Mexico)
Unemployment Rate
(U.S.)
NAFTA
IRCA
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin-Watson

Coefficient

t-statistics

Probability

1979498.
-467.7360
-41123.75

6.416207
-4.450346
-1.643734

0.0000
0.0003
0.1176

-20416.02

-0.630015

0.5366

299227.1
-266860.1
0.805693
0.751719
2.137564

2.774119
-2.484884

0.0125
0.0230
14.92740
0.000007

F-Statistic

Probability (F-stat)

The new regression gives a significantly better fit to the model, increasing the
adjusted R-squared from 59% to 75%, which adjusts for the decrease in the number of
explanatory variables. The F-statistic is still highly significant, and the individual tstatistics in this regression are much more significant than the original regression. The
increased significance among the individual explanatory variables suggests that there
may have been significant multicollinearity in the previous model.
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The wage ratio variable is negative and highly significant, which is consistent
with the theory that as wages in Mexico increase relative to U.S. wages, the flow of
migration decreases. Mexico’s unemployment rate in this regression has changed signs to
have a negative effect on the flow of migrant workers. This result is contrary to the
theory, which states that as jobs in Mexico become scarce, the relative returns from
migration increase, leading to an increase in the flow of migration. However the
coefficient is not highly significant and therefore the result is inconclusive in determining
the relationship of unemployment in Mexico to the flow of migration.
The NAFTA dummy variable has also changed signs in this regression, however
this result is highly statistically significant, whereas the previous negative coefficient was
not significant. The positive effect of NAFTA on the flow of migration is contrary to
what was predicted in this paper. It could be explained that the negative effects that were
expected to result from NAFTA are picked up by the wage ratio variable. If the wage
ratio accounts for changes in relative wages that resulted from NAFTA, then the effects
that the NAFTA dummy variable picks up are difficult to predict.
Looking at the graph of the wage ratio, there is a noticeable change in the trend
after 1995. Mexican wages appear to improve relative to U.S. wages during the period
following NAFTA, reversing the downward trend of the wage ratio. By estimating the
trend regression line for the decreasing wage ratio it is possible to look at the level of
border apprehensions that would be expected if the trend had continued. The actual wage
ratio in the year 2000 was 696, whereas the predicted wage ratio using the trend from
1977 to 1994 is approximately 257. If the trend wage ratio had continued the predicted
number of border apprehensions in the year 2000 would have been approximately
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1,715,511. The reported number of apprehensions for 2000 of 1,510,148 is a decrease of
approximately 205,000 from the expected number of apprehensions using the trend wage
ratio. This shift in the trend of the wage ratio could be attributed to the effects of
increasing wages in Mexico relative to U.S. wages due to NAFTA.
The NAFTA coefficient tells us that after 1995 the number of annual border
apprehensions increased by approximately 299,000. If the decrease in border
apprehensions found to result from the change in trend of the wage ratio is attributable to
NAFTA, then it is possible to calculate the effect of NAFTA to be a net increase in
border apprehensions of approximately 94,000 for the year 2000. This positive effect of
NAFTA, although contrary to the theory in this paper, it is possible according to Acevedo
and Espenshade’s prediction. Acevedo and Espenshade predicted a short run
complementary relationship between the mobility of capital and the flow of
undocumented workers, which could be what is seen from this NAFTA coefficient.
Because we are only looking at a five-year post-NAFTA period it is possible that the long
run effects of free trade that would eventually lead to a net decrease in the flow of
migration, are not seen in this series of data.
If we attribute to NAFTA a net increase in border apprehensions of 94,000, then
according to Espenshade’s approximation, the actual flow of migration would have
increased by about 206,800 after the signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (approximately 2.2 times the increase in border apprehensions). The IRCA
coefficient estimates that border apprehensions decreased by 267,000 after 1988, which
means a decrease of about 587,400 in actual migrant flow. The results of both dummy
variables are highly significant with confidence levels of one and two percent.
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VII.

Conclusion
The results of this regression analysis help explain the factors that influence the

flow of undocumented migration. This information is necessary in determining the best
means of controlling the increasing number of illegal workers in the U.S. As long as there
exists a discrepancy between expected incomes from migrating to the U.S. and staying in
Mexico, there will always be a flow of undocumented workers. The possibility of open
borders between the U.S. and Mexico is highly unlikely anytime in the near future. The
major driving force for the flow of migration in this regression is found to be the wage
ratio between the U.S. and Mexico. This is consistent with previous research by both
Lalonde and Topel (1997), and Razin and Sadka (1997). The empirical results of this
regression indicate that the best way to decrease migration is to decrease the wage ratio
through increased Mexican wages relative to U.S. wages.
If NAFTA is successful in improving Mexico’s economy through free trade, this
will lead to an eventual decline in the flow of undocumented migrant workers. The free
trade agreement is predicted to increase employment opportunities in Mexico through the
movement of capital from the U.S. to Mexico. The relocation of American-owned
factories to Mexico should eventually increase the demand for labor in Mexico, leading
to an increase in overall Mexican wages. An initial shift in the trend of declining Mexican
wages relative to U.S. wages can already be seen during the post-NAFTA period.
However, the results of this regression imply that we have not yet seen a net decline in
undocumented migration resulting from NAFTA.
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The net increase in the flow of migration resulting from the NAFTA dummy
variable in this regression could be a result of the short run impacts of the deterioration of
trade barriers that are discussed in Razin and Sadka (1997). Increased trade between the
U.S. and Mexico may have led to the commercialization of the agricultural industry in
Mexico, leading to the destruction of many agricultural jobs. Since much of the flow of
undocumented migration is attributed to agricultural workers, it is quite possible that the
destruction of agricultural jobs in Mexico would lead to an increase in the flow of
migration.
A movement towards NAFTA was seen in 1965 with the beginning of the
maquila program, which allowed U.S. industries to establish factories within 20

kilometers of the U.S.-Mexico border as long as all imported products were eventually
re-exported. This program brought economic growth to the border regions of Mexico,
even during periods of recession experienced by the rest of Mexico. The maquila
program began a pattern of migration in which many families migrated from central
Mexico to the Northern border region. The wives were able to find employment in the
maquiladoras, while the husbands crossed the border to find even better paying jobs in
the U.S. We can predict that a similar pattern of migration might eventually occur as a
result of NAFTA. However, in this case we expect to see an increase in migrant workers
coming from Guatemala and El Salvador to get jobs in Mexico and the U.S., assuming an
eventual improvement in both the U.S. and Mexico’s economy resulting from NAFTA.
This is why policy makers realized that a free trade area in North America is not the final
solution. In order to decrease the flow of migration across borders, we must eventually
expand the free trade area to include Central and South America as well, this being the
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purpose of the FTAA. There are many arguments against free trade regarding external
costs to the environment and labor markets, but as far as a long run plan to decrease the
flow of undocumented migration, free trade is a reasonable solution. Although the results
of this paper do not show a definite decline in migration resulting from free trade, the
theory indicates that the long run future impact of free trade will be to decrease
undocumented labor migration.
The alternative solution to the problem of undocumented migration is through
immigration policy reform. The regression analysis in this paper looked at the impact of
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and the effect it had on undocumented
migration. The empirical results of the regression determined that this reform act had a
significant negative impact on the flow of undocumented migration. Another
Immigration Reform Act was implemented in 1996, which may have also had a
significant effect on the flow of migrant workers. However, since this reform act would
have only affected the last four years of the data for this study, it is not likely to have had
a significant effect for this particular regression.
The 1996 IRA increased resources available for border patrol to restrict illegal
entry to the U.S. This included an increase in the number of border patrol agent§, a $12
million budget to build a fourteen mile fence along the border, and provisions that
increase fines for apprehended migrants who under IRA, now have to pay $50 to $250 for
an initial arrest, and double that fine for each additional arrest (Espenshade, Baraka,
Huber, 1997). One month previous to the signing of the Immigration Reform Act of
1996, a Welfare Reform Act was also signed by President Clinton, which could have had
additional impacts on the flow of undocumented migrant workers. The Personal
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act specified reduced access to
social welfare programs for legal immigrants. Many undocumented migrants have
relatives or social ties to legal immigrants in the United States. This provision could have
affected the ability of legal migrants to help support undocumented migrants, decreasing
the overall flow of migration.
It is not possible to separate the effects of the 1996 Immigration Reform Act from
the effects of NAFTA in 1994. Some of the increase in border apprehensions found to
result from the NAFTA dummy variable could be attributed to the increase in spending
for border patrol that resulted from the 1996 IRA. It is difficult to say whether the
increase in border apprehensions resulting after 1994 is a result of short run effects of
NAFTA or a result of the increased budget for border patrol.
Guestworker programs, which are often associated with immigration policy, are
another proposed solution to the problem of undocumented migration. These programs
have many social implications that must be considered in determining whether this is an
appropriate method to decrease undocumented migration. The current H-2A program
may appear to be a good way to provide documentation so that both employers and
workers can benefit from seasonal employment, however this program has its faults.
People have frequently compared the guestworker programs to a form of indentured
slavery for foreign agricultural workers. Workers are provided with minimal housing,
they are paid less than most native workers are paid, and are constantly threatened with
deportation. The threat of deportation discourages workers from complaining about being
denied worker’s rights and proper compensation. Currently there are 42,000 farm
workers in the United States on H-2A visas (Yeoman, p. 42).
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Proposals for a reformed guestworker program, called H-2C, have even fewer
considerations for the workers, and exclude many of the previous provisions regarding
basic rights for workers. The H-2C program would bring in an additional one million
guestworkers, and would allow farmers to pay even lower wages to foreign laborers. The
new program would require guestworkers to work a minimum of 180 days per year to be
eligible for visas, but would also grant legal residency to workers who maintain eligibility
in each of five years. Due to the short agricultural season, it is nearly impossible for
workers to achieve the 180 days of required employment, therefore this is simply a false
incentive that most workers will never achieve. Proposals also include suggestions to
convert the required provided housing into housing vouchers for guestworkers. However,
most of the areas in which the agricultural work is done have no cheap available housing
that the vouchers could be used for.
The new program would also eliminate the current qualification that farmers are
only to request guestworker visas when there is a shortage in the native labor force.
Studies of the current H-2A program have found that farmers are easily able to obtain
guestworker visas without exhausting possible native labor sources. Employers often turn
away job applicants without reason, so that they can hire guestworkers at lower wages.
The H-2C program, if passed by Congress, could have a significant effect on the wages
and employment of American farm workers.
Although it may appear that guestworker programs are a suitable method to
provide documentation to benefit both employers and migrant workers, we have not
managed to come up with a legitimate program that does not take advantage of the
guestworker’s temporary status. Even if we were able to design a program in which
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workers were treated as legitimate residents while they were here, we should still explore
methods of decreasing the dependency of migrant labor for both the workers from
Mexico, and U.S. employers.
The empirical results from the regression analysis indicate that the most
influential factor in determining the flow of migration from Mexico to the U.S. is the
relative wages in both countries. The best method for decreasing the flow of migration is
to focus on the long run improvement of Mexican wages relative to U.S. wages.
Although Mexico is the largest contributor of migrant workers to the U.S., it is one of
many countries whose citizens migrate to the U.S. in search of higher wages and
increased employment opportunities. The effects of globalization throughout these
contributing countries of migrant workers will inevitably have a significant effect on the
flow of undocumented migration to the United States in the near future.

!
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